The court comments:
Laclede was to “(i)nstall, own, maintain and operate all distribution facilities from the point of delivery as defined in Paragraph 3(b) . . . .” Paragraph 3(b) provided: “the point of delivery shall be at the outlet of (Amoco) header piping.” Also under Paragraph 3(b) Amoco was to own and operate all the facilities on the bulk side of that header piping. Laclede thus bound itself to buy all its requirements from Amoco by agreeing to attach its distribution lines to Amoco's header piping; and even if a change of suppliers could be made under the contract, Laclede could not own and operate a separate distribution system hooked up to some other supplier's propane storage tanks without substantially altering the supply route to its distribution system or making a very substantial investment in its own storage equipment and site. As a practical matter, then, Laclede is bound to buy all the propane it distributes from Amoco in any subdivision to which the supplemental agreement applies and for which the distribution system has been established.
When analyzed in this manner, it can be seen that the contract herein is simply a so-called “requirements contract.” Such contracts are routinely enforced by the courts where, as here, the needs of the purchaser are reasonably foreseeable and the time of performance is reasonably limited. . . .
How does seeing the contract as a "requirements contract" solve the consideration problem?